ANALYSIS: Politics of Kerry-Lugar Bill —Ijaz Hussain

Vice President Joe Biden has proposed the idea of “Pakistan First”, according to which the road to victory in Afghanistan lies through the targeting of the Taliban in Pakistan rather than those in Afghanistan

Pakistan is in the eye of storm because of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Initially, the government took the view that the aid bill was the best thing that ever happened to Pakistan and the Interior Minister reportedly tried to get the federal cabinet adopt a resolution lauding it.

The opponents of the bill, especially the army, took a different view. The army believed that some of its clauses posed a threat to Pakistan’s security and expressed its reservations through the media. The government not only utterly disagreed with the assessment but was also not pleased with the army’s use of a public forum to express it.

President Zardari was so convinced of his viewpoint that he asked his ministers to go out and defend the bill with full force. At one point, the controversy became so intense that rumours emerged that he was thinking of sacking the army chief, and political pundits feared a replay of the October 1999 episode.

What is the politics behind the Kerry-Lugar controversy? Is this just an honest difference of opinion or is there more to it than meets the eye?

We begin by looking at the objectionable provisions in the bill. They require the Pakistan government to do the following: cease support to extremist and terrorist groups that have conducted attacks against the US or coalition forces in Afghanistan and to dismantle their bases in Quetta; to prevent terrorist groups such as LeT and JeM from carrying attacks from Pakistan’s territory into India and to dismantle the terrorist base in Muridke; to exercise effective control of the military including oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning and military involvement in civil administration; and finally to desist from using or diverting the American assistance for expansion of its nuclear programme, or reallocating Pakistan’s own financial resources that would otherwise be spent for activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons programme

These provisions are apparently very innocuous because they seem to promote the same objectives that Pakistanis profess. However, on close scrutiny one finds that through the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the Obama Administration aims to advance its agenda with regard to the army, against whom it has a grouse on a number of counts.

To begin with, it accuses the army of duplicity vis-à-vis the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan. Concretely put, it thinks that while the army has acted robustly against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat, it has failed to show the same level of commitment against the Afghan Taliban who have established “safe havens” in Pakistan from where they operate in Afghanistan. In fact, the US administration goes to the extent of claiming the presence of the entire Afghan Taliban leadership, termed the “Quetta Shura”, in Pakistan. It wants the army to act against them.

Given the latter’s reluctance, Vice President Joe Biden has proposed the idea of “Pakistan First”, according to which the road to victory in Afghanistan lies through the targeting of the Taliban in Pakistan rather than those in Afghanistan.

Second, the Obama Administration believes that even though the Pakistani government has banned jihadi organisations like LeT and JeM, the army still considers them strategic assets to be used against India at an opportune time. The government’s failure to prosecute the head of Jama’at-ud Dawa (formerly the LeT) Hafiz Saeed, who is accused of masterminding the Mumbai terrorist attack, may have confirmed this impression. Through the Kerry-Lugar, the Obama administration wants to pressurise the government to proceed against these organisations and considers the dismantlement of the Muridke base in particular, which is regarded as the GHQ of the LeT, as a test case.

The Indian lobby in the US Congress must have been instrumental in getting this provision inserted in the bill. However, it would be wrong to assume that Congress did so solely because of Indian bidding. The fact of the matter is that the US is wary of any act of terrorism in India as it wants to build India as a counterweight against China.

Third, the Obama administration wants Pakistan’s military to accept civilian supremacy not only in political matters but also in matters such as oversight of the military budget, the chain of command, the process of promotion of senior military leaders, etc. It is pushing for this less out of a desire to promote democracy in Pakistan and more for strengthening the hands of President Zardari who is highly amenable to American manipulation because he largely owes his present position to the US. If this comes about, it would open ways and means to control the army and especially the ISI, which the Americans suspect is in cahoots with the Afghan Taliban.

Finally, the Obama administration, which is opposed to Pakistan’s nuclear programme (let us not forget that during the 2004 US presidential election candidate, Senator Kerry, a co-sponsor of the bill, declared that if he won, he would try to get control over Pakistani nukes) is keen to get it frozen through the bill not only by stopping the diversion of American assistance but also the reallocation of Pakistan’s own financial resources to its development.

Why is the government so keen to support the Kerry-Lugar Bill?

There are two explanations for it. First, it is in dire need of money to run the affairs of the state and thinks that once the funds start flowing, it would help strengthen its hold on power, though there are some in its ranks who may be thinking of riding a new gravy train.

Second, through the Kerry-Lugar Bill, it wants to put the army under leash because this is the only source from where it feels a threat to its political longevity. It does not care if it has to join hands with the devil or the Americans (aren’t two the same?) for the purpose. Let us not forget that at the time of Prime Minister Gilani’s visit to the US, to please the Americans the government tried to put the ISI under the Ministry of Interior by issuing a notification to that effect, though subsequently in the face of resistance from the army it had to back down.

Why did the army go public with its reservations on the bill? It did so because it was reportedly left with no other option as it wrote to the government about its concerns and the COAS personally conveyed them to Zardari before the adoption of the bill, but to no avail. Besides, it contends that the last version of the KLB that it received on September 15 did not contain the 12 clauses that were added subsequently in the final version, which it claims it never received.

Irrespective of the controversy, the army seems to have the following objective in going public: send a loud and clear message to President Zardari that he cannot hope to control the army by aligning himself with the US; and to the US that by aligning itself with Zardari it cannot hope to use the army to promote its agenda in the region. Above all, in a clever move, it presented itself as the champion of the people’s rights by asking the government to submit the matter to the National Assembly for its decision.

What is likely to be the fallout of the episode?

It goes without saying that the army has deep distrust for the government and the Obama administration’s explanatory note, that the Kerry-Lugar Bill is no threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty, may not have allayed it. In fact, Sen Kerry’s statement the other day in which he revealed that the Pakistani government did not raise any concern over the bill with the congressional delegations that visited during the last several months may have deepened it. It would not be surprising if the minus-one formula that had receded into the background following the revelations by Brig Imtiaz comes to the fore again.

The writer as an Adjunct Professor in the National Institute of Pakistan Studies at the Quaid-e Azam University, Islamabad. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com