In the Afghan marshes —Rasul Bakhsh Rais

The political reality in the home countries of the troops fighting in the ‘marshes’ of Afghanistan and on the ground is very different. The Taliban insurgency is stronger and growing at a time when the popular support for the war is declining fast

Afghanistan is a dry country, but it seems that coalition forces are stuck in the mud and more they try to pull themselves up, more they sink in. A marsh is a more apt description of the situation because it reminds everyone of America’s Vietnam experience.

The Vietnam War is one of those uncomfortable truths that American society has lived with for almost a generation. The American establishment and the leaders at that time thought they had a global responsibility to defend the ‘free world’ and resist by all means the ‘evil’ forces of communism.

But what has Vietnam got to do with Afghanistan today?

The American-led war in Afghanistan today has a great deal of resemblance with Vietnam, except for the place, time and actors. No two wars are the same, and perhaps never will be, but analogies can be drawn on several counts.

The first and foremost common factor is war in other time zones, far away from the homelands. It may be said that all foreign wars, from ancient times to the colonial era, were fought in distant lands. True, but those didn’t last eight, ten or fifteen years, and the citizens of the homeland were not directly affected. Rather, domestic support for atavistic and economic reasons was stronger both in the ancient times and the age of colonial empire building.

The Soviet Union, despite being geographically contiguous to Afghanistan through its Central Asian republics, and with easy land access, couldn’t win its last colonial war against the Afghans. The Americans were the first to recognise that Afghanistan could become the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. And it did.

Who turned Afghanistan to the Soviet Union’s graveyard? American and Saudi Arabian money and the superb insurgency strategy of Pakistan played a great role in defeating the Soviets. No doubts about that. But it was finally the Afghan’s sacrifice, his suffering, his blood and his deep love for his country that forced the Soviet Union out. Make no mistake about who really defeated the Soviet superpower.

Mercenaries do not fight wars of national liberation; they can be hired only to suppress such wars by providing intellectual or material support.

The irony of history is that the Americans have become trapped in Afghanistan in more or less like the Soviets. Both had a new vision for Afghanistan according to their own respective ideological templates. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to defend and consolidate a socialist regime that they helped cultivate. They interpreted events in the country as all invading countries do: they wanted the world and their own citizens to believe that only a minority, backed by foreign powers, mainly Pakistan and the United States, supported the Afghan Mujahideen.

And the Soviet cast the their war with the Afghans in ideological terms — against feudal tribal culture and reactionaries that wanted the clock of progress and history to be turned back. They presented themselves in exactly the same way as during their colonisation of Muslim regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia: in the name of progress and civilisation.

This is an old beaten argument and has no resonance in modern times when we place European colonisation in some international context. Nor had this view any popular acceptance in old times beyond the local collaborators.

The American-led coalition has similar ‘noble’ and ‘altruistic’ objectives — peace, state- and nation-building, and above all freedom and democracy in Afghanistan. I doubt if this was the original intent. If it was, the Americans and other Western powers that supported the Afghan resistance should have stayed back and rebuilt Afghan state and society after the war with the Soviets.

Freedom and democracy are good selling points at home to obtain public support and resources to fight such long wars. More than democracy, it was and continues to be a national security debate that shaped the American decision and will be a factor as Afghan security experts and commanders on the ground assess the situation and advise President Barack Obama on reworking the US strategy in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan started in the wake of 9/11 tragedy, as Washington found the fingerprints of Al Qaeda leaders hiding in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan all over it. The primary objectives were to displace the Taliban regime, arrest or destroy the Al Qaeda leadership and their transnational network operating from Afghanistan.

The first objective was achieved sooner than expected because there was really no match between the US war machine and the Taliban militia. The Taliban rather conserved their manpower and resources by melting back into the population, mostly comprising complex but supporting networks of tribes and sub-tribes.

The Americans in their hubris and triumphal sentiment lost lot of capital and good will in Afghanistan by courting the warlords, against whom the Taliban movement had in fact emerged more popular, in the beginning at least. The American political roadmap for Afghanistan, beginning with the Bonn conference, began to be shaped by ethnic warlords from the non-Pashtun regions that acted as the ‘true’ victors against the ‘vanquished’ Taliban.

Playing one ethnicity, particularly the minorities, against the majority, is an old game of foreign powers, and the Americans couldn’t escape this trap because of its convenience: they had non-Pashtuns and obviously some prominent Pashtuns already on their payroll. The post-Taliban state and nation building has alienated the Pashtuns and good number of them have seen only military operations, bombardments and collateral damage; and very little on the ground in terms of development, peace and security.

The resurgence of the Taliban over the past four years, and more so in the past couple of years, is a consequence of many failures, mostly political and relating to state and nation building.

Today, the question is: can this eight-year-old war be won? Not any time soon, and not with the present level of troops and resources. The follow-up question then is how long can the Americans and their international coalition partners stay in Afghanistan and fight this war? The political and public answer is: as long as it takes and as much resources as it requires.

The political reality in the home countries of the troops fighting in the ‘marshes’ of Afghanistan and on the ground is very different. The Taliban insurgency is stronger and growing at a time when the popular support for the war is declining fast. This may impose difficult choices, each with not so pleasant consequences.

Going back to the hearts-and-minds strategy may save American pride and peace in Afghanistan — less war and more development, and people see it happening in their lives. And it is time to get serious about negotiating with the Taliban leadership. But for that to happen, the Americans will have to change their lenses that see the Taliban and Al Qaeda not as two, but one entity.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of “Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk